a lightweight matrix based approach for database recovery by Sai, Mohamed El
i 
LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION WARFARE: A LIGHTWEIGHT MATRIX 
BASED APPROACH FOR DATABASE RECOVERY 
 
 
 
By 
 
MOHAMED EL SAI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Science in Computer Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Arts and Sciences 
April 2015 
  
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2015 
Mohamed El Sai 
All Rights Reserved 
 
ii 
 
Signatures Redacted
Signatures Redacted
iii 
 
 
THESIS COPYRIGHT RELEASE FORM 
LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY NON-EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION LICENSE  
By signing and submitting this license, you (the author(s) or copyright owner) grants to Lebanese 
American University (LAU) the non-exclusive right to reproduce, translate (as defined below), and/or 
distribute your submission (including the abstract) worldwide in print and electronic format and in any 
medium, including but not limited to audio or video. You agree that LAU may, without changing the 
content, translate the submission to any medium or format for the purpose of preservation. You also agree 
that LAU may keep more than one copy of this submission for purposes of security, backup and 
preservation. You represent that the submission is your original work, and that you have the right to grant 
the rights contained in this license. You also represent that your submission does not, to the best of your 
knowledge, infringe upon anyone's copyright. If the submission contains material for which you do not 
hold copyright, you represent that you have obtained the unrestricted permission of the copyright owner to 
grant LAU the rights required by this license, and that such third-party owned material is clearly identified 
and acknowledged within the text or content of the submission. IF THE SUBMISSION IS BASED UPON 
WORK THAT HAS BEEN SPONSORED OR SUPPORTED BY AN AGENCY OR ORGANIZATION 
OTHER THAN LAU, YOU REPRESENT THAT YOU HAVE FULFILLED ANY RIGHT OF REVIEW 
OR OTHER OBLIGATIONS REQUIRED BY SUCH CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT. LAU will 
clearly identify your name(s) as the author(s) or owner(s) of the submission, and will not make any 
alteration, other than as allowed by this license, to your submission 
 
Name: Mohamed El Sai 
Signature:  
Date: 17/04/2015 
 
 
 
  
Signatures Redacted
iv 
 
 
PLAGIARISM POLICY COMPLIANCE STATEMENT 
 
I certify that: 
 I have read and understood LAU’s Plagiarism Policy.  
 I understand that failure to comply with this Policy can lead to academic and 
disciplinary actions against me. 
 This work is substantially my own, and to the extent that any part of this work is 
not my own I have indicated that by acknowledging its sources. 
 
 
Name: Mohamed El Sai 
Signature:  
Date: 17/04/2015 
 
  
Signatures Redacted
v 
Dedication Page 
I would like to dedicate my thesis work to my family. Special thanks for my wife 
who supported me all the time and provided me with the appropriate environment to be 
able to accomplish my work. Another special thanks for my brother-in-law who was a 
role model for me and a big supporter for my Masters plans. In addition, I would like to 
thank some of my friends who encouraged me and kept me motivated. 
And finally, I wish to dedicate this work to a special and unique person, my mom, 
who was a great inspirational force. 
 
  
vi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
 
The help and assistance of many people made this work possible. I would like to 
especially thank my advisor, Dr. Ramzi Haraty, for his guidance, support and patience. 
Thanks to Dr. Samer Haber and Dr. Azzam Mourad for being on my committee. 
Finally, I would like to thank everybody who helped in this work especially during 
the proofreading. 
 
 
  
vii 
INFORMATION WARFARE: A LIGHTWEIGHT MATRIX BASED APPROACH 
FOR DATABASE RECOVERY 
 
 
MOHAMED EL SAI 
ABSTRACT 
The age of Internet Technology that we are in has introduced new types of attacks to 
new assets that didn’t exist before. Databases that represent Information assets are 
subject to attacks that have malicious intentions such as steeling sensitive data, deleting 
records or violating the integrity of the database. Many counter measures have been 
designed and implemented to protect the databases and the information they host from 
attacks. While preventive measures could be overcome and detection measures could 
detect an attack late after damage has occurred, there is a need for a recovery algorithm 
that will recover the database to its correct state before the attack has taken place. 
Numerous damage assessment and recovery algorithms have been proposed by 
researchers. In this work we present an efficient lightweight detection and recovery 
algorithm that is based on the matrix approach and that can be used to recover from 
malicious attacks. In addition, we will implement the algorithm and compare its 
performance to other detection and recovery algorithms. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
The safety of information assets is part of any online system. The data to be 
protected could include strictly confidential information such as financial transactions, 
medical records or even military and trade secrets [1]. There are three main approaches 
that can be used to protect any asset: prevention, detection and correction. Preventive 
methods include techniques such as authentication, authorization, access control, 
firewalls, and data encryption. Detection methods include techniques such as intrusion 
detection systems, checksums, and trend analysis [2]. The two main techniques of 
corrective methods are logging and backup. 
This layered paradigm of protection is used in order to have multiple lines of 
defense for the system where in case one line is overcome by an attack, the following 
line will continue to protect the system. Preventive measures are designed to prevent 
attacks or at least minimize their impact but still malicious users and hackers’ manage to 
overcome these security measures and attack the system. 
When the preventive measures fail to protect the system, detection measures are 
there to assess and quantify the damage that occurred on the system. Since no detection 
technique could guarantee the immediate capture of an attack, damage would be a very 
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probable result of the attack. The damage could take many forms such as deleted 
records, reading confidential data or maliciously modifying records and hence violating 
the integrity of the database. The main aim after detecting that damage has occurred is to 
clean the database and remove the effects of the attack. In such case a recovery 
algorithm is needed to do this job. 
Due to the fact that we live in highly interconnected world on the internet and 
online systems level, billions of computers worldwide are connected to each other and 
are sharing information. The implication of this process is ease of launching an attack 
from any place in the world to any other place in the world. This in turn makes the idea 
of preventing an attack nearly impossible. Therefore a big portion of the effort of 
fighting back is to detect attacks (malicious transactions) as soon as possible, assessing 
the damage that took place and finally recovering from the attack by removing malicious 
transactions and their ripple effects on the database. Many approaches have been 
developed to enhance the recovery by new ways of integrating tables and structured data 
such as the one [3] named “Silk”. 
In the recent times, information systems along with its technologies have flooded 
the globe with data. One of the most important critical success factors for any 
organization is the ease and speed of accessing, processing and making use of 
information [4]. Information assets need to be defended in the domain of information 
warfare in a similar way to classical types of war where human beings are to be 
protected.  
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So what is meant by information warfare? In [4] it is defined as the war for 
dominating the ‘info-sphere’. Information warfare covers the full range of competitive 
information operations from destroying IT equipment to subtle perception management 
and from industrial espionage to marketing. Two main objectives in information warfare 
are: 
• To use your own systems and the information associated with them to gain 
advantage against competitors and adversaries. 
• To protect your information assets and systems from anyone who could damage 
them either by intent or by mistake. 
There are many strategies and techniques in information warfare but all of them 
move around the fundamental weapon and target ‘information’. Information is leveraged 
and manipulated by the attacker in order to access the information of the entity being 
targeted. Some of the strategies that can be used in information warfare include [4]: 
• Destroying or deleting data: destruction of data occurs with the physical 
destruction of the storage medium or the data residing on this medium. 
• Denying access to data: it is the attempt to temporarily deny access to data to a 
point in time where it becomes useless due to the temporal dimension of data. 
• Steal data: stealing confidential information from competitors such as trade or 
product secrets. One important thing that differentiates stealing data from stealing any 
other physical asset is that stealing a physical asset has a higher probability to get 
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noticed while stealing data has a very low probability to get noticed due to the fact that 
the victim might still have a copy of the data on the same place from where it was read. 
• Manipulation of data: data can be inserted, deleted or updated to accomplish the 
target of the attack. Fraud is one example of such an attack where the attacker would 
manipulate the data in such a way to hide his fraud. 
Some of the weapons or tools that can be used in information warfare include: 
• Logic bombs: These can be Trojan horses that are either present within a normal 
code or are independent programs. Such a weapon can be used by an employee that left 
his company on bad terms so s/he puts a code in their system that will get executed when 
certain conditions are fulfilled to run a virus or do other malicious actions. 
• Computer viruses: These are code fragments that insert themselves into a 
program to modify it and harm the hosting system. Such weapons can be used in today’s 
smart phones and might cause phone system failure. 
• Information collection: The more the information we have about our adversary 
will make our position stronger. This information will inform us ahead of time about the 
intentions or plans of the other entity [5]. 
• Information degradation and denial of service: This is used to prevent the 
adversary from getting complete or correct information at the time the information is 
needed for processing [5]. 
• SQL injections: SQL injection is the most common methodology employed by a 
hacker to exploit vulnerabilities in software applications. By vulnerabilities we mean 
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weak links in the software that exposes unauthorized data or information to a user. SQL 
injection occurs when the user input is incorrectly filtered for embedded SQL 
statements. The technique is powerful enough not only to expose the information to the 
user but also modify and delete the data [6]. 
In order to be in stronger position in the domain of information warfare, two 
important concepts should be understood: the information-in-warfare and the 
information based process [7]. To be able to defend your data and to be able to exploit 
the data of others, one should have a full understanding of information warfare strategies 
and tactics. One should not only know how to attack or defend himself/herself, but also 
how to gain and exploit. If we attack a system and do not gain access to it or do not 
exploit it, then the attack is useless. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The database should be recovered as soon as an attack is detected. Unfortunately, 
some time would have elapsed till we detect that an attack took place. Therefore 
transactions following the point where the attack happened may have been affected by 
simply reading data written by the malicious transaction. To be on the safe side, all 
transactions from the point of the attack and onwards should be assessed whether they 
are affected or not.  
There are two main paradigms that the damage assessment algorithms are based 
upon: transactional dependency [8] and data dependency [9]. To illustrate the idea of 
damage recovery, let’s consider two committed transactions, Tx and Ty where Tx is a 
malicious transaction and Ty as a transaction that read from Tx (i.e. Ty read a data item 
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that was last written by Tx). Since Ty reads from Tx then we categorize Ty as an 
affected transaction. The recovery mechanism should retain the integrity of the database 
by not only deleting Tx, but also redoing Ty. 
With the decreasing cost of hardware nowadays and the needs for large amounts of 
data to be captured for many reasons such as financial modeling and weather 
predictions, databases are hosting huge amount of data. This makes the process of 
damage assessment and recovery more time consuming. Therefore, the complexity and 
efficiency of the recovery algorithm is the main interest in this work. Sometimes the 
attack is not direct, for example what could happen after the attack finishes is the target 
of the attack instead. To illustrate this idea we can think of a log file of a very large size 
(due to the fact that it belongs to a large database with a large number of transactions 
taking place on it). The recovery process will have a bottle neck when trying to use this 
tremendous log file to recover the database. As a result, this unrealistic time to check the 
log file would by itself lead to denial of service. Thus, we are interested in finding an 
algorithm that prevents such drawbacks or at least one that reduces them. For this 
purpose, some researchers [8],[10], [7], and [9], have proposed using auxiliary structures 
for keeping track of dependencies while other researchers proposed using clusters or 
matrices. 
1.3 Scope of the Work 
          In this thesis, we present a damage assessment and recovery algorithm that is 
based on matrices. The suggested approach keeps a single matrix data structure along 
with the log file of the database. This matrix saves the dependency between the 
transactions. When a transaction depends on some other transaction, both of these 
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transactions will be part of the matrix. Only transactions that have a dependency on 
other transactions are stored in the matrix since they are the only part of the log file that 
is needed for the damage detection and assessment. All the needed information during 
the recovery phase of the process will be retrieved from this matrix. The aim of this 
work is for efficient and lightweight database recovery model. The matrix has been 
optimized in order to have a very low memory footprint by storing only the information 
that could be used during the detection and assessment phase of the algorithm. In 
addition, during the recovery phase of the algorithm we only scan part of the log file in 
order to clean the database from the malicious transactions and their effects. 
The main contribution in our model is the use of a single matrix without any 
additional data structures, thus requiring less space to be stored and less time to be 
scanned when compared with graphs or clusters. In addition, the use of sorted linked 
lists in our algorithm requires less time to detect the thread of affected transactions to be 
recovered later in the recovery stage. Moreover, the use of only one matrix with linked 
lists rather than using two matrices for each of the read and write operations, makes the 
algorithm more scalable for the recovery of larger databases. Since the dependency 
between transactions is only used to detect the affected transaction, the model of 
dependency used in the algorithm is transactional dependency instead of data 
dependency. This makes the algorithm require even less space and perform better than if 
we use data dependency. The data stored in the matrix are only integers signifying the 
primary keys of the transactions that depend on each other. 
1.4 Definitions 
The following definitions will be used throughout the thesis: 
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Definition 1: A write operation wi[x] of a transaction Ti is dependent on a read ri[y] 
operation of Ti, if wi[x] is computed using the value obtained from ri[y] [11]. 
Definition 2: A blind write is when a transaction Ti writes data item x without reading 
the previous values of x [12]. 
Definition 3: A write operation wi[x] of a transaction is dependent on a set of data items 
I, if x = f(I); i.e, the values of data items in I are used in calculating the new value of x. If 
x ≠ I, the operation is called a blind write. In this case if the previous value of x (before 
this write operation) is damaged and none of the data items in I are damaged, then the 
value of x will be refreshed after this write operation [11]. 
Definition 4: If X is totally ordered under ≤, then the following statements hold for all a, 
b and c in X: 
If a ≤ b and b ≤ a then a = b (antisymmetry) 
If a ≤ b and b ≤ c then a ≤ c (transitivity)  
a ≤ b or b ≤ a (totality) 
Definition 5: If a read(x)/write(x) is to be executed in a strict execution, it will be 
delayed until all write(x) operations are either committed or aborted [5]. 
Definition 6: A transaction management mechanism guarantees rigorousness if the 
following two conditions hold [13]: 
1. It guarantees strictness, and 
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2. No data item may be written until the transaction which previously read either 
commits or abort  
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
The remaining chapters of the thesis are organized as follows: chapter 2 will 
present a review of the literature of the related research work in the area of information 
warfare and recovery from attacks. Chapter 3 will present the new detection assessment 
and recovery algorithm that we propose with an example of how it works. In chapter 4 
we present and analyze the results of the experiments done with the algorithm after its 
implementations and doing simulations of database recovery on sample data. Our 
conclusion and the potential proposed future work will follow in chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Due to the importance of the topic of database recovery, many studies have been 
done by researchers in order to find an efficient solution to detect and recover the 
damage caused by malicious attacks. There are two main types of algorithms used for 
database attack detection and recovery. The first type uses transactional dependency 
where there is no capture of the exact data item that causes the dependency such as the 
model presented in [14]. The second type uses data dependency where the data item in 
concern is captured. In each type several models have been proposed such as the cluster 
based, graph based and matrix based algorithms. An overview of the available literature 
about these models will be provided in this section.  
2.1 Traditional Methods 
The main approach that is used in traditional approaches is to scan the log file 
from the point where the attack happened until the end of the file to do the recovery by 
undoing malicious transactions and redoing the affected ones and this approach focuses 
on the complete rollback of the database. Bai and Liu [15] presented a new traditional 
recovery based algorithm. Unlike other traditional recovery paradigms, in this paper they 
proposed a lightweight dynamic Data Damage Tracking, Quarantine, and Recovery 
(DTQR) method which can sustain an excellent data service while healing the database 
server when it is under a malicious attack. 
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To overcome the limitations of other approaches such as substantial run time and 
long system downtime, they have suggested a new recovery approach named ‘Trace’ 
which is a zero system downtime database data damage tracking quarantine and 
recovery solution. This approach is based on the following three pillars: 
1. Cleaning the compromised data on-the-fly 
2. Avoid blocking read only transaction by having multiple copies 
3. For the read-write transactions, the detection and recovery are done 
simultaneously in order to minimize the overall recovery time 
Trace uses an advanced tagging technique that is proved to be efficient in tracking 
affected transactions without the need for logging the read operations. 
 The Trace approach has two working modes: standby mode and cleansing mode. 
The chosen mode of the Trace depends on the current situation of the database and more 
precisely on the fact that there is an attack on the database or not. In both case the Trace 
depends on an intrusion detection to notify it about any attack or data corruption risk 
present on the database. In case no attack is reported by the intrusion detection system, 
Trace works in the standby mode. Whenever an attack is reported, Trace will be 
activated and shifts to the cleansing mode where it executes the quarantine, assessment, 
and cleansing procedures. 
2.2 Using Graphs for Recovery 
In [12] Zou and Panda developed a set of graph based models for damage 
assessment. These models assume that the log files are not damaged in an attack and 
there are no blind writes in the database system. The result that is generated from these 
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models is the set of affected transactions that will later be submitted to the recovery 
model that will do the necessary steps to roll back the database to the previous state of 
integrity. While the paper focuses on the detection part (leaving the recovery to other 
papers), it uses a more general database that is distributed in nature and has many sites 
such that each one of these sites has a local manager to coordinate with the other sites or 
the central coordinator (depending on the specific model used). The two main 
assessment models presented in [12] are the centralized and the peer-to-peer. 
In the peer-to-peer model there is no central coordinator to help in the detection 
process. Here, each local manager is responsible for its local log file and scanning this 
local file in case there is a need for that. In the case where a local manager suspects 
about affected transactions at the global level, it will multicast the identifiers of these 
transactions to each site that has a sub-transaction of the affected transaction executed. 
After that, each receiving site will scan its local log file from the point where the first 
affected transaction happened to detect if there are any other affected transactions. Then 
the newly discovered information (about any new detected affected transactions) will be 
sent to all the relevant sites to continue with the detection process. 
On the other hand the centralized model requires the presence of a central 
coordinator for assessing the damage after an attack. A voting exercise can be used to 
select the coordinator where this coordinator to be elected it should have these features: 
1. Located at the most convenient location distance wise from the other sites. 
2. Equipped with processing capabilities to enables it to perform its coordination 
role. 
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3. Connected to the other distributes sites using a fast link that enable the fast 
transmission of messages for database damage detection purposes. 
4. There should be some sort of cluster or back of the coordinator machine is case 
the machine fails for some reason or another. 
The centralized model is divided further into three sub models that are listed below: 
1. Receive and forward model 
2. Local dependency graph model 
3. Central graph repository model 
In [10] Ammann, Jajodia and Liu present a graph based model that focuses more 
on the recovery and repair of databases after an attack happens. This recovery model can 
be divided into two categories, a cold-start approach where the database would be 
unavailable during the recovery and a warm-start approach where normal execution may 
continue with some degradation in the quality of service. The recovery of the database in 
[10] assumes that the history of transactions is Serializable with a classical transaction 
processing model. In [10] there are two sets of transactions, set B {B1, B2 …Bn} of bad 
or undesirable committed transactions and set G {G1, G2…Gn} of good or desirable 
committed transactions. The main data structure used in this model is the dependency 
graph where the previously identified bad and good transactions are put into a hierarchal 
shaped graph to illustrate which transactions depend on each other to facilitate the 
recovery process. 
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2.3 Clusters and Sub clusters 
The main idea behind clusters is the segmentation of the log file. The sub 
clustering approach takes the previously clustered log file a step further by clustering it 
more mainly for size considerations. In [16] Ragothaman and Panda suggested a 
limitation on the size of the cluster. These limitations could be the number of committed 
transactions, the size of the cluster and the time window of the cluster. 
In [7] Haraty and Zeitunlian presented a log clustering algorithm based on exact 
data dependency. The further sub clustering of clusters is done in two ways: number of 
data items or space occupied by the cluster. The proposed model assumes the following 
in order to be able to work properly: 
1. The existence of an intrusion detection system that detects the 
attacking/malicious transactions. 
2. The database schedule is modified to produce customized types of read and 
write operations. 
3. The execution history is rigorously Serializable. 
4. The clustered log will contain only committed transactions 
5. Transaction ID’s are sequentially incremented starting from T1 and 
incrementing by 1 for each next transaction. 
The two data structures used in [7] are the transaction sub cluster list and the sub 
cluster data list. The first list is used to store the transaction ID and the sub cluster in 
which the data items of the transaction are stored. On the other hand, the second list is 
used to store the sub cluster ID, the transaction ID and the corresponding data item that 
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could be a read, write, actual read, overlooked read, predicate or statement. In this model 
the clusters and sub clusters are determined periodically once the list of committed 
transactions is obtained from the temporary log. This is done as mentioned before either 
by the number of committed transactions in the cluster or the size of the cluster. 
Once the intrusion detection system detects a set of malicious transactions, the 
transaction sub clusters list and the cluster/sub cluster data list are checked in order to 
detect the affected transactions. This step of checking the lists represent the detection 
part of the algorithm where after it the recovery phase can start by scanning only the sub 
clusters that contain the damaged data items. The detection part of the model uses two 
additional data structures: Damaged_DI, which is the list of data items that are affected 
by the malicious transactions and Damaged_PB, which contains the predicate block of a 
transaction Ti that has been affected by a malicious transaction. These two data 
structures are first initialized to null. Later on, every transaction in the transaction sub 
cluster starting from the point of attack is checked to detect the affected transactions. 
In the recovery phase of the algorithm these are the steps to be done: 
1. Scan all the Damaged_PB records that resulted from the assessment part of the 
model 
2. The sub cluster in which the transaction belongs is obtained from the 
transaction sub cluster list. 
3. Each block is re-evaluated 
4. The updated data items are flushed back to the database 
5. Damaged_DI and Damaged_PB are cleared and released. 
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Another cluster based algorithm is presented in [17], where Sobhan and Panda 
proposed a new damage assessment and recovery algorithm that is based on a new 
logging protocol that records all needed information for the repair of the database. This 
model defines a cluster based on predicates and their following statements and calls it 
Predicate Statement Block. A predicate is a precondition with a set of statements where 
the predicate condition that must evaluate to true for the statements to be executed. The 
predicate block can be either conditional or unconditional where in the first type there 
are two explicit predicate one on each branch, while in the second type there is only one 
predicate. 
The model in [17] has a set of assumptions in order to be able to perform 
assessment and recovery: 
1. The model uses a log sequence number (LSN) 
2. The model follows the write-ahead-logging protocol 
3. The database system follows the Steal/No Force protocol 
4. The use of cache consistent check pointing 
5. The history produced by the scheduler is rigorous Serializable 
6. The log cannot be modified by the users and no part of this log is purged 
7. Nested transaction are not allowed 
8. A transaction writes a data item into a stable database only 
 
2.4 Before Images 
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In [18], Xie et al presented a recovery approach that can track the damage in a 
more complete way by using “before image” tables. In their model they adopted a new 
type of before image table which is in general a table that is transparent to the users and 
is similar to the normal database tables. The before image table is a replica of the base 
table in the database but without the integrity constraints that are set on the base table. 
The before image tries to preserve the history of the transactions so that at any point in 
time we can roll back to the last state of integrity. Whenever a certain row is deleted or 
updated in the base table, a copy of the row’s previous/old data is added to the before 
image table of that base table. In order to prevent the before image table to grow 
exponentially in size, there is a defined time window for the data in the before image to 
be out of date and hence deleted. 
The approach used in [18] is based on the inter-transaction dependency graph that 
stores the inter-transaction dependency. In addition to the graph, the model adds two 
data items for each data item in the database. These additional data items are x.ins_tran 
that captures the last transaction that wrote the data item x and x.del_tran that represents 
the last transaction that deleted the data item. An additional table is used to capture the 
inter-transaction dependencies. This table is called TranDepTab and has these three 
columns: 
1. commit_ord: the order in which dependent_tran has committed 
2. dependent_tran: represents the transaction depending on other transaction, 
3. precursor_tran: represents the transaction being depended by dependent_tran 
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The algorithm in [18] is invoked whenever an intrusion is detected. The recovery 
of the database is done in two phases: 
1. detect all the transactions that need to be undone 
2. delete the effect these transactions had on the database 
The major contribution of this model is that the detection of the affected transactions is 
much easier. This is due to the presence of the TranDepTab table that captures all the 
dependencies between the transactions in the form of a graph. 
2.5 Column Dependency 
In [19] the authors presented a column-dependency based model that is used to 
detect the affected transactions in order to recover the database from the affected and 
malicious transactions. This model is based on the transactional dependency approach. 
Moreover, the authors presented two versions of the algorithms a static recovery scheme 
and an online recovery scheme. The proposed static recovery algorithm has a set of 
inputs and a set of outputs and performs the recovery in two phases. The inputs of the 
algorithm include the following: 
1. The set  of committed transactions 
2. The schedule of execution of the above committed transactions 
3. The list of malicious transactions which could be provided for example by an 
intrusion detection system 
The output of the recovery algorithm is a consistent database that has been cleaned from 
the effects of the malicious transaction that were part of the input of the algorithm. 
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 While the static recovery algorithm halts the database during the recovery period, 
the online recovery version allows the active transactions in the database to continue 
execution and the new transaction to start executing. One of the main differences 
between the two recovery schemes is that the vulnerability window in the online version 
is not fixed because transactions continue to execute and hence the vulnerability of 
having new malicious transactions is larger. The online algorithm performs the recovery 
in three phases (instead of two in comparison to the static scheme). These three phases 
are: 
1. Assessment phase 
2. Recovery phase 
3. Confinement phase 
2.6 Matrices in Recovery 
In [4], Haraty and Zbib presented a matrix based damage assessment and recovery 
algorithm that is used to recover from malicious attacks that are part of the information 
warfare. This model assumes that there is an external intrusion detection system that is 
responsible for the detection of the malicious transactions a reporting them to the 
proposed model and that the execution history is rigorously Serializable. The authors of 
[4] use check points on the version of the log file in order to prevent the log file from 
growing tremendously in size and hence lowering the performance of their model. 
The main data structure in this model is the dependency matrix that is treated as a 
log file where it will be flushed at certain check points when the size grows above a 
certain limit. This matrix is a two dimensional array where the columns represents the 
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set of data items present in all the tables of the database and the rows represent all the 
committed transactions that occurred up to certain point in time. Any data item x could 
have three types of interactions with a transaction T: 
1. x could be blindly written by T 
2. x could be modified according to one or more committed transactions 
3. x could be left unmodified by T (for example T read x) 
According to the above scenarios, the dependency matrix is filled by 00, 01 or –Ti to 
reflect how the transaction interacted with the data item. In order to solve the problem of 
saving the information about the set of transactions that affected a data item (case 2 
above), an additional data structure will be used to store this data since the dependency 
matrix has only one entry per each transaction and data item. This data structure is also a 
two dimensional array that holds the transactions that affected a certain data item to be 
used in the detection phase. 
 The detection part of the algorithm works by traversing the dependency matrix 
row by row from the transaction that followed the first malicious transaction. While 
scanning the matrix, if the algorithm finds a 01 it will check if it is one of the malicious 
or affected transactions. In case a negative value is found in the matrix the respective 
transactions are retrieved from the secondary matrix and checked to in the same way to 
see it they have malicious or affected transactions. Any transaction that is found to be 
affected is added to a third data structure that will hold all the affected transactions to be 
recovered from in the recovery phase. 
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 In the recovery phase of the model there will be an additional data structure that 
will be used to read the log file. When the detection algorithm finds all the affected 
transactions in the database, the recovery phase is started by sending the set of malicious 
and affected transactions found. The recovery algorithm will make sure to delete (undo) 
the malicious transactions from the log file and to redo the affected transactions to make 
that they execute properly without any interference from the malicious transactions that 
would have been deleted by that time. In [4], the authors presented a fast detection and 
recovery algorithm that is based on a simple matrix data structure but on the other hand 
the algorithm uses more than one data structure to do the detection and recovery and 
hence consumes a big amount of memory that can be reduced. 
In [20], Zhou presented a new database recovery model the uses pre-developed 
data structures affected transactions and data items without accessing the log file. The 
data structures used in [20] are built using bit vectors which are manipulated using the 
logical AND and OR operations. Zhou presented two models in his paper; a base model 
that uses transactional dependency to identify affected transactions and later on uses this 
information to identify the damaged data of those affected transactions. The second 
model uses the previous base model and adds parallelism to it in order to enhance the 
performance of the damage assessment process. 
The base model assumes the following in order to function correctly: 
1. Presence of some sort of intrusion detection system that forwards the malicious 
transactions list to the base model 
2. The execution history is rigorously Serializable 
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3. The database log cannot be corrupted 
4. Any data item is not updated twice by any transaction 
5. The dependency relationships between transactions will not change during 
recovery 
The four data structures of the base model are: 
1. Read_Matrix: it stores information about the data items that have been read by 
transactions 
2. Write_Matrix: it stores information about data items that have been written by 
transactions. The values in the first two matrices are bit number (0’s and 1’s). 
3. Damaged_Data_Vector (DDV): it stores the data items that have been identified 
as damaged during the assessment phase 
4. Damaged_Transaction_List (DTL): it stores all the transactions that have been 
identified as damaged 
The parallel damage assessment version of the model partitions the transactions into 
clusters based on their relationships with each other. This will help in making the 
damage assessment and recovery more efficient because in large databases many 
transactions are unrelated to each other. 
2.7 Fuzzy dependency 
The fuzzy dependency approach presented in [21] is a loose dependency 
relationship between two sets of attributes. Zou in his paper [21] defined the fuzzy 
dependency as follows: 
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“For two sets of attributes X and Y of a relation R, Y is fuzzily dependent on X (or X 
fuzzily determines Y) if and only if for every value ai in the domain of X, ai belongs to 
Domain(X), there is an uniquely determined subset Si’ in the domain of Y, Si’ is a subset 
in Domain(Y), such that a tuple Ti in a relation instance of R with value ai for X should 
have a value bi belong Si’ for Y”. 
 The fuzzy dependency model can be used in three different ways: 
1. Constraint specification: specifying a constraint on possible tuples that can form 
an instance r of a relation R and to enforce database policies such as checking the 
integrity of the fuzzy relationship. This will ensure that database users don’t 
mistakenly enter illegal data. 
2. Intrusion detection: fuzzy dependency can be run periodically on a database to 
check the integrity of the database and detection any intrusion by malicious 
transactions. 
3. Minimizing the DOS (denial of service): By generating fuzzy values for the 
damaged data in the database due to malicious transactions, fuzzy dependency 
minimizes the possibility of having a denial of service due to an attack. 
The suggested recovery algorithm consists mainly of the “Fuzzy Value 
Generator” that interacts with the database and the “Fuzzy dependency storage”. This 
architecture consists of fuzzy check, data fetch unit, fuzzy reasoning unit, supplemental 
fuzzy rule unit, usage identifier, value finalizer and a supplemental reasoning unit. The 
key requirement of the model is that the fuzzy value generator should be very fast in 
comparison to other conventional database recovery techniques. 
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 The main contribution of the authors’ model in [21] is that it allows a fast 
recovery after an attack due to the fact that unlike other traditional database recovery 
models, the proposed model does not require intensive search of the database logs based 
on data or transactional dependencies. On the other hand, the proposed fuzzy model 
must be supplemented with semantic reasoning because it cannot guarantee total 
accuracy. 
2.8 Transaction Fusion 
 In [22] Chen et al presented a new database recovery model that skips the 
unnecessary steps done in the traditional models. While the traditional models will undo 
all the malicious and affected transactions and then redo all the affected transactions 
again, the model presented in [22] will assess the need for recovery through a proposed 
recovery approach and then later on fuse malicious transaction and valuable affected 
transactions. By skipping unnecessary steps, the proposed model will have a better 
execution time. The aim of the Real-Time Database Recovery Algorithm with 
Transaction Fusion (RTDBS) is to achieve partial and timely information more than to 
gain absolutely correct but outdated information. 
 The model presented in [22] significantly reduce the number the total number of 
transactions that will be undone or redone. This way the recovery can be done more 
efficiently by removing unnecessary steps and minimizing the I/O operations and log 
scanning. Even though the RTDBS model reduces the time for the recovery, it does that 
at the cost of having partial recovery instead of recovering the whole damaged scope 
since it uses an assessment approach to select which affected transactions to redo. 
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2.9 Selective Recovery 
 A new database recovery model is presented in [13]. Xia et al in [13] presented a 
self-healing model that is based on transactional dependency and performs selective recovery by 
undoing only suspect transactions in order to reduce the effect of those suspect transactions as 
much as possible. The proposed model performs the following steps in order to recover the 
database: 
1. Find the suspected transaction 
2. Generate the Undo Transaction Set (UTS) 
3. Undo each transaction in the UTS 
4. Redo unfinished transactions 
The model uses a transaction reverse dependency log as (DepID, TranNum, 
TranID1, TranID2, TranID3, … TranIDn) and it logs the transactional dependency 
between the database transactions. Here DepID is the ID of the transaction that the other 
transactions (TranID1  TranIDn) depend on and TranNum is the number of those 
transactions. For example if we have (T1, 2, T2, T3), it means that there are two 
transactions (T2 and T3) that depend on T1. In addition, the model uses the transaction 
operation log which logs the different data modification operations done by the 
transactions. This log is represented by this structure (TranID, TabID, Attrs, TupleNo, 
OldVal, NewVal) where TranID is the transaction numbers and the TabID is the ID of 
the table in which the transaction operated and modified the fields listed in Attrs of the 
row with number TupleNo from the previous value OldVal to the new value NewVal. 
The transaction reverse dependency log (TRDL) is used to generate the undo transaction 
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set (UTS) through two approaches; a recursive algorithm or a stack based algorithm. The 
concept that this model presents describes the TDRL as a set of trees and the UTS as a 
member tree and performing recovery on the database is like tree traversal. 
2.10 Distributed Recovery 
  A recent research in [17] presented a new model for the recovery of the 
heterogeneous distributed databases. The methodology of the proposed model is on a 
hard limit of failure tolerant databases and is named failure evaluation and patch (FEP). 
The responsibility of failure evaluation and patch (R-FEP) is to find the malicious and 
affected transactions and recover the database from their effects. The authors’ definition 
of a distributed database is that it’s simply a collection of data which belong logically to 
the same system but are spread over a dispersed network of computers. In this 
architecture, transactions have global unique identifiers that indicate takes into 
consideration each site. The model has the following assumptions: 
1. The execution history is Serializable with two-phase locking (2PL) protocol 
2. For the atomicity of the transactions, the authors use the two-phase commit 
(2PC) protocol 
The failure can be only caused by all committed transactions. Therefore, the set 
of committed malevolent transactions is M = {M1, M2, M3... Mn} and the set of good 
conditioned transactions is C= {C1, C2, C3….Cm}. At any site s, a committed 
transaction Ti is dependent upon Tj if a data item ‘d’ is stored at that site such that Ti 
reads ‘d’ after Tj updates ‘d’, and no other transaction updates ‘d’ between the time. In 
order for the FEP to work, the authors assume the presence of a local transaction 
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manager (LTM) at each site and a FEP module at each site. The recovery is done 
through local operations at the sites where the FEP module instructs the LTM to perform 
some critical operations. The FEP is responsible for knowing the local log in order to 
locate the sub transactions that are affected by a malicious transaction and to perform the 
cleaning process for these kinds of transactions. On the other hand, the LTM is 
responsible for only coordinating the FEP process for the distributed transactions which 
are having their coordinators at the sites. This coordination between the FEP and the 
LTM modules is what makes the proposed model work. The patching process is done by 
the LTM modules where the FEP module only sends the transactions to be patched to 
the LTM module. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MODEL 
3.1 Overview  
In this chapter, we present a new detection and recovery model that has been 
optimized to have high accuracy and efficiency in the process of assessment and 
recovery from malicious transactions resulting from attacks. The first stage of this 
algorithm is to detect the effects of the malicious transactions after being initiated with a 
call that has the list of malicious transactions as input to the call. This step mainly tries 
to find all the affected transactions (transactions that read from malicious or affected 
transactions). Finally, the algorithm will recover the database to a consistent state by 
undoing the malicious transactions and redoing the affected transactions. 
3.2 Assumptions 
As mentioned in the previous section, the proposed model will receive a set of 
malicious transactions that will trigger the execution of the algorithm. So the model 
assumes that there is some sort of an intrusion detection system that determines the set 
of malicious transactions. After receiving the set of malicious transactions, the algorithm 
will guarantee the efficient detection and recovery of the database. 
Serial execution ensures a Serializable history. In such a history, every transaction 
is assumed to be correct as it would be depending on the committed transactions only. 
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Hence, Serializability provides correctness [5]. An update to any transaction in the 
system will be represented in our model as if it is a new insert transaction. In our 
proposed model, we assume we have a rigorous Serializable history. A sequential log 
file is also maintained in which only committed transactions are saved. This log file 
cannot be accessed by the users at all times and it will be used during recovery. 
In our model we use only one matrix without any other data structure that supports 
it. Panda and Zhou in [23] had two different matrices one for the write operations and 
another for the read operations in addition to two other supporting data structure to do 
the recovery. In addition, they used logical operations between the matrices to discover 
dependencies. In our algorithm we only use one matrix without any logical operations. 
In addition Haraty and Zbib in [24] used two data structure in their model. First data 
structure in the core matrix that stores the dependability of a transaction in relation to a 
data item. While the second data structure, the secondary structure in used to store the 
specific transactions ‘y’ that a transaction ‘x’ depends on. 
Sometimes the attacker has indirect intentions when launching the attack. Maybe 
s/he does not want to steel confidential data or delete records from the database and s/he 
plans to target the detection and recovery mechanism by itself. The recovery procedure 
may take a long time to recover the database and during this time the database may be 
set to inaccessible mode for the users that has legitimate transactions to execute on the 
database. As a result a situation of denial of service would occur. In order to prevent or 
reduce the possibility of such a scenario, our algorithm will be very efficient in terms of 
time and memory space when recovering the database. Therefore denial of service due 
to the recovery process would be less probable with a fast recovery algorithm that 
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requires low memory space and uses one data structure to store the dependencies and 
recover the database.  
3.3 The Matrix 
In this section we will discuss the structure of our algorithm’s matrix. We assume 
that this matrix is built dynamically along with the execution of every transaction. Only 
committed transactions are inserted into our matrix. The matrix will be an array of sorted 
linked lists. Each data item will either be blindly written by the transaction, left 
unmodified by the transaction, modified according to one previously committed 
transaction, or modified according to a set of previously committed transactions. Our 
matrix only takes into consideration the transactions that have modified data according 
to a set of one or more previously committed transactions. 
The entries in the array will represent the set of transactions that have modified 
data items in the database after reading data from other previously committed 
transaction(s). This is translated to having the ID of the transaction included in the array 
as an array index. The actual entries that are stored at a specific index of the array are the 
linked lists of transaction IDs that the transaction with ID equal to the array index have 
read from. So for example, if we have a transaction with ID = 200 and this transaction 
modified any data item after reading from transactions with IDs 150 and 151, then the 
matrix will have at index 200 a sorted linked list containing IDs 150 and 151 
respectively. 
Using the above approach makes sure that the data needed for detection and 
recovery is captured in the matrix. In addition, only the needed information is saved in 
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one consolidated data structure without the need for any other secondary or tertiary 
structure like other algorithms. The proposed algorithm does not take into consideration 
which specific data item has been read from other transactions it only cares about the 
fact that transaction y has read data from transaction x and hence y depends on x. The 
specific details of the dependency between transaction y and x are not needed for the 
detection or recovery parts because if transaction x is malicious, the recovery phase will 
undo it and redo transaction y in all cases. The below figure depicts the matrix that is 
used in our model.  
 
Figure 3.1 Dependency Matrix     
 
3.4 Detection Algorithm 
As we have previously mentioned, we assume the presence of an intrusion 
detection system that will generate the list of malicious transactions. The detection phase 
starts by finding the malicious transaction with the smallest ID. Since we have a 
rigorously Serializable history, we will not face the case where we have a transaction Tj 
such that j< i and Tj depends on Ti. Our algorithm starts the detection from the next 
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transaction after the smallest malicious ID. So for example if the smallest ID in the 
malicious transactions list is 100, we start checking if a certain transaction is affected 
from first transaction with ID>100 and present in the matrix. This reduces the detection 
time since we will not check older transactions that have committed before the first 
malicious transaction and therefore cannot be affected due to the rigorous Serializable 
history. 
Starting from the first transaction bigger than the smallest ID in the malicious list 
and till the end of the matrix, the algorithm tries to find all the directly or indirectly 
affected transactions. A transaction can be affected in two ways directly affected if it has 
read data from a malicious transaction or indirectly affected by reading data from an 
affected transaction. The algorithm will traverse the linked list found at the inspected 
array entry for a number of times equal to the total number of entries in the list of 
malicious transactions and the list of affected transactions. Since the linked list is a 
sorted one, the execution will stop when we find in the linked list an ID equal to the ID 
of the malicious/affected transaction that we are looking for or when we reach an ID 
greater than the ID of the malicious/affected transaction that we looking for. Having a 
sorted linked list saves execution time and enhances performance of the algorithm since 
not every time we are going to go through the entire linked list. 
After checking the linked list at the specific array entry and we find the 
malicious/affected transaction that we are looking for, we add the index of the array 
entry to the list of affected transactions. If we have not found the malicious/affected 
transaction we move to the next entry in the matrix array.  
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For example, if the set of malicious transactions is { Ta, Tb, Tc} and the set of 
affected transactions is { Td, Te, Tf}  and the detection algorithm is running and it reached 
transaction Tm, the algorithm will check if any of the above malicious transactions is 
present in the linked list at entry Tm in the array. If any of the malicious transactions { Ta, 
Tb, Tc}  is found in the linked list of Tm, them Tm is added to the list of affected 
transactions. If Tm does not has any of the above mentioned malicious transaction IDs in 
its linked list then it does not imply that Tm is clean because it may be indirectly affected 
by other affected transactions. So the next step is to check Tm against the affected 
transactions list if any of the { Td, Te, Tf} IDs is found in Tm linked list then we will add 
Tm to the affected transactions list. 
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3.5 Example on the Detection Process 
Consider a database for a health management system that mainly manages the 
process of prescribing medications to patients by doctors. It contains information about 
the following: 
 Doctors: a unique identification number for each doctor (DID), name (DName), 
major (DMajor), and years of experience (DExperience). 
 Patients: a unique identification number for each patient (PID), name (PName), 
date of birth (PDOB), and address (PAddress). 
 Types:  a unique identification number for each medication type (TID) and type 
name (TName). 
 Medication: a unique identification number for each medication (MID), 
medication name (MName), and medication type (MType). 
 Prescription: a unique identification number for each prescription (PrID), the 
patient to whom this prescription belongs (PID), the doctor that gave this 
prescription (DID), and the date of the prescription (PrDate). 
 Prescription_details: a unique number that identifies each Prescription_details 
entry (PDID), the ID of the prescription that this prescription_detail belongs 
(PrID), the number of times to take the prescription per day (PDfrequency), and 
the duration in days of the treatment (PDDays). 
Consider the following transactions in the database stated above: 
T1 = Doctors (‘1’, ‘Peter’, ‘Heart & Blood Vessels’,’10’); 
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T2 = Types (‘4’, ‘Heart Medication’); 
T3 = Medication (‘11’, ‘Aspirin’, ‘4’); 
T4 = Types (‘8’, ‘Pain Killers’);  
T5 = Medication (‘9’, ‘Panadol’, ‘8’); 
T6 = Doctors (‘7’, ‘Robert’, ‘Internal Medicine’, ‘15’); 
T7 = Patients (‘14’, ‘Helen’, ‘1/1/1980’, “LA”); 
T8 = Patients (‘3’, ‘George’, ‘9/10/1982’, ‘Pennsylvania’); 
T9 = Prescription (‘1’, ‘3’, ‘7’, ‘1/1/2015’); 
T10 = Prescription (‘2’, ‘14’, ‘1’, ‘31/1/2015’); 
T11 = Prescription (‘3’, ‘3’, ‘1’, ‘15/2/2015’); 
T12 = Prescription_details (‘1’, ‘1’, ‘9’, ‘1’, ‘5’); 
T13 = Prescription_details (‘2’, ‘2’, ‘9’, ‘2’, ‘7’); 
T14 = Prescription_details (‘3’, ‘3’, ‘11’, ‘3’, ‘14’); 
Let the dependency matrix that corresponds to this database be called M. We 
assume that the transactions occur in the order presented above. This matrix will be 
made up as the transactions occur one after the other. When T1 occurs it does not get 
added to the matrix since it does not depend on any other transaction that happened 
before it. The same case applies with T2. When T3 occurs, it will be the first transaction 
to be added to M since it depends (reads from) other transactions (T2), therefor both T3 
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and T2 get added to the matrix with T3 pointing to T2 since it reads from it (TypeID). T4 
is a standalone transaction so it doesn’t get added to the matrix. Same case as T3 happens 
with T5 since it reads from T4, so both T5 and T4 are added to the matrix. Each of T6, T7, 
and T8 are independent transactions so they don’t affect the contents of the matrix. The 
orders table depends on another two tables from which it reads data from (Patients table 
and Doctors table). T9 depends on T8 and T6, T10 depends on T7 and T1, and T11 depends 
on T8 and T1. As a result we will have three rows added to the matrix; one with T9, T8, 
T6 and one for T10, T7, T1 and one for T11, T8, and T1. Prescription_details table depends 
on both prescription and medication tables. When T12 takes place it reads from T9 and 
T5, while when T13 occurs it depends on T10 and T5 and when T14 occurs it depends 
on T11 and T3. We will then have three rows added to the matrix (T12, T9, T5 + T13, 
T10, T5 + T14, T11, T3). 
Matrix M is presented in the below figure: 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Matrix M for the presented example 
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As we can see in the above figure that the entries in each row are sorted in 
increasing order of transaction number. This will enhance the performance of our 
algorithm by enhancing the detection part where not all entries in each row will be 
checked. For example if we are searching for T6 in the row headed by transaction T10, 
we first come across T1 which is not equal to T6 or greater than it so we continue forward 
to reach T7 which is not equal to T6 but is greater than T6 so we stop the execution of the 
loop here because we are sure that T6 is not present in the specific rows we are searching 
at. In a nutshell, the matrix used in the detection algorithm is made of rows and columns 
where the first column (column-1) represents all the transactions that depend on other 
transaction, while the successive columns (columns-2  column-n) represent the 
specific transactions that column-1 depends on. 
Now that we have seen the matrix structure and how it is filled from a sample 
execution of database transactions, we can move to the part of using the populated 
matrix in the detection of malicious transactions effects. The trigger for the start of our 
algorithm is the occurrence of a malicious attack that is detected by an external intrusion 
detection system. The detection part of the algorithm uses the populated matrix in order 
to find the list of affected transactions that needs correction in order to roll back the 
database to a state of integrity. This will insure that later on in the recovery phase of the 
algorithm, malicious transactions are deleted (as if they never happened) and affected 
transactions are redone. 
For illustration purposes, consider that the first transaction in the list of malicious 
transactions is T6. As we have said before, there is an intrusion detection system that will 
notify our algorithm about the list of malicious transactions. We have chosen one 
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transaction to be malicious for simplicity and in case there was more than one 
transaction, the detection steps to be presented below will be repeated for each malicious 
transaction in the list. Due to our assumption of a rigorous Serializable history, only 
transactions that happened after T6 could be affected and therefore need to be examined. 
The detection algorithm will start the execution by examining the next transaction 
greater the T6 and since the current matrix includes neither T7 nor T8 in its first column, 
we start the search at the first transaction that is greater than T6 and exists in the matrix. 
This transaction is T9. The detection algorithm will check the list of transactions on 
which T9 depends on to see if T6 is one of them. T6 is one of the transactions that T9 
depends on so T9 is an affected transaction and we add it to the list of affected 
transactions that need to be redone in the recovery stage of the algorithm. An important 
thing to mention here is that our algorithm enhances the detection phase performance by 
starting its detection from the first transaction that is greater than the smallest malicious 
transaction. In our example we skipped transactions smaller than T6 (T1 to T5). In real 
databases our algorithm is highly scalable by skipping unnecessary rows checks. 
There are two main data structures used in the algorithm to keep track of the 
malicious transactions and the affected transactions. The malicious transactions data 
structure will remain fixed but the affected transactions data structure will most probably 
grow while running the detections part of the algorithm. For the detection purposes, both 
the malicious and the affected transactions will be treated the same. This means that 
during the detection phase the algorithm takes each transaction in the malicious or 
affected sets and check the potential transactions if they affected or not. The malicious 
set is {T6} and the affected transactions set is {T9}. Continuing with our detection part 
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we check the remaining part of the database and confirm that no other transaction 
depends on T6. This leaves the affected transactions set as {T9}. Other transactions could 
be indirectly affected; this case happens when a transaction does not read directly from a 
malicious transaction but from an affected one. Our algorithm only uses the matrix 
structure to check for affected transactions and no need for other data structures like 
other algorithms. 
The algorithm will continue the execution till the end of the database to find all the 
affected transactions. Now we move to transaction T9 to check if any transaction 
depends on it. We start from the first transaction that is greater than T9, T10 but T10 does 
not depend on T9 so we move forward in the database till we reach T12 which depends 
on T9. So T12 is now added to the list of affected transaction to become {T9, T12}. No 
other transaction reads from T9 except T12, so we move to the next affected transaction 
in the list T12. Searching for other transaction based on T12 leaves us with no new 
discoveries (no new transaction depends on T12) and hence finalizing the list of affected 
transaction to be {T9, T12}. At this stage we can say that the detection part of the 
algorithm is complete and we can forward the set of malicious transaction {T6} and the 
set of affected transactions {T9, T12} to the recovery part of the algorithm to do what is 
necessary to recover the database from both the malicious and affected transactions. 
3.6 Recovery Algorithm 
          After the detection phase of the algorithm identifies all the affected transactions as 
explained in the previous sections, the recovery phase starts by rolling back the database 
to the last consistent state. This is done mainly in two steps undoing the malicious 
transactions and redoing the affected transactions. 
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 In order to enhance the performance of the recovery algorithm, an array data 
structure will be used to read the log file into it. This array will include only the 
transactions that occurred from the ID of the smallest malicious transaction till the end 
of the log file. This way we only copy to the array transactions that could be either 
undone or redone because the transactions that took place before the first malicious 
transaction are neither malicious nor affected and hence are not part of the scope of the 
recovery phase. The array is indexed by the ID of the transaction, so for example if 
transaction Ti is part of the array it will be found at array[12]. This indexing approach 
will enhance the performance of the recovery algorithm by decreasing the access time 
for transactions to be redone or undone. Whenever a transaction is to be referenced, we 
do not go through the whole log file but we only need the ID of the transaction and we 
reference it directly from the array. 
Our recovery algorithm starts with the malicious transactions and undoes them 
and their effects and then moves to the affected transactions and redoes them in a 
database where the malicious transactions do not exist anymore because they have been 
deleted in the previous step. What is actually done in this step is that for each malicious 
transaction in the input to the recovery algorithm, we go to the array and check the 
details of the transaction and reverse its actions. So for example if a malicious 
transaction added a record to the database, undoing the transaction means deleting the 
record that have been maliciously added. On the other hand, when we have an affected 
transaction the action to be done is to redo the transaction. So if we have an update 
transaction we will try to re-execute the transaction to make sure that it runs properly 
without any interference from malicious transactions what so ever. 
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When the recovery algorithm finishes with the last affected transaction in the list, 
we would have reached the end of the recovery phase and rolled back the database to a 
consistent state. The array will be deleted since its role in referencing the details of the 
needed transactions is completed. Moreover, undoing malicious transactions and redoing 
affected ones will have updated the database log automatically and we will end up with a 
log file that reflects a consistent database. 
3.7  Example on the Recovery Process 
 This section of the thesis report will present the recovery part of the example that 
was started in section 3.5. The detection part of the algorithm resulted in the following: 
1. The set of malicious transaction is {T6}  
2. The set of affected transactions is {T9, T12} 
Our recovery algorithm will start with the first malicious transaction (we have only one 
in our case), T6. In our example T6 = Doctors (‘7’, ‘Robert’, ‘Internal Medicine’, ‘15’). 
Undoing T6 means that we need to reverse the insert statement by using a delete 
statement instead. As a result the Doctor with DID = 7 is deleted from the Employees 
table. This way the malicious transaction and its effects have been removed from the 
database. The next step is to deal with the affected transactions. The first affected 
transaction on the list is T9 where T9 = Prescription (‘1’, ‘3’, ‘7’, ‘1/1/2015’). Redoing 
T9 means that we have to add a new prescription for patient with ID equals to 3 and by 
doctor with ID equals to 7. We just deleted the doctor with ID = 7 because it was added 
by a malicious transaction, therefor we cannot add the Prescription (‘1’, ‘3’, ‘7’) and 
hence redoing this transaction means deleting the prescription in order to preserve the 
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referential integrity in the database because doctor with ID = 7 does not exist anymore. 
T12 is the next affected transaction on the list. T12 = Prescription_details (‘1’, ‘1’, ‘9’, 
‘1’, ‘5’). It has a similar case to T9 and we will have to delete the prescription_detail 
with ID = 1 because it tries to reference prescription with ID = 1 that is non-existing at 
the current time. 
 The model presented in this report uses a single matrix for the detection and 
recovery. In addition to some auxiliary data structure such as the array holding the log 
file, our algorithm depends solely on the matrix for the detection of the affected 
transactions. The used matrix is fast and simple to access unlike other data structures 
that are used in other recovery models such as graphs. Moreover, the algorithm skips 
transactions that are obviously clean in the detection phase and uses check points in 
order not to make the log file grow tremendously. In the recovery part of the algorithm 
only the transactions that are needed in the recovery are copied to the array and hence 
enhancing the performance and memory consumption of the algorithm. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
In order to analyze the performance of our proposed algorithm, we simulated the 
model in a simulation environment that is very similar to the real environment where the 
algorithm should be used. As described in previous sections, we assume the presence of 
an intrusion detection system that will forward a list of malicious transactions to our 
model. Therefore, our model is initiated as soon as there is an intrusion detected by the 
intrusion detection system. The main data structure that the model depends on is the 
dependency matrix that is built before the algorithm is initiated and is fed as an input to 
the detection algorithm. More precisely, the dependency matrix is built after 
understanding the dependency relationships between the database tables and what 
transactions read data items and what transactions write data items. Another data 
structure that is built during the execution of the algorithm is a version of the log file that 
is used in the recovery phase and is built from reading a sample of the execution history. 
The main assumption of our model is that the execution history is rigorously 
Serializable. This will ensure that no transaction can depend (read data items) from any 
transaction that occurs after it. Therefore, we cannot find two transactions Ti and Tj such 
that i < j and Tj happens before Ti (Tj < Ti). This assumption will highly enhance the 
performance of our model because it makes sure that any malicious transaction that 
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happened at time t can only affect transactions that happened after t not before it and 
hence we do not search for affected transaction that happened before time t. 
The detection algorithm which is the first phase of the model is initiated by a call 
from the intrusion detection system with a list of one or more malicious transactions that 
have infiltrated the database and violated its integrity. The malicious transaction with the 
smallest ID is the most important one because it determines from where the detection 
algorithm will start its search for affected transactions. Once the detection phase is done, 
the list of affected transactions detected is forwarded to the recovery phase of the model 
which undoes the malicious transactions and redoes the affected ones. In our simulation 
we use more than one value for the smallest malicious ID in order to show how our 
algorithm performs when it scans different portions of the log. Moreover, the analysis 
results will show how our algorithm we perform due to its low memory consumption as 
a result of the lightweight matrix that it uses. The algorithm will also be tested on 
database of different sizes in order to evaluate its performance on larger databases and 
how much it is scalable. 
In our experiment we used the “Northwind Database” that has been tweaked in 
order to serve our experiment. This database is provided as a template in the Microsoft 
Access or Microsoft SQL Server. The data will be exported to .sql format and then 
imported to MySQL. The server that was used is WampServer 2.0 (that is available 
online and is downloadable for free) with the following configuration: Apache Version 
2.4.9, PHP Version 5.5.12 and MySQL Version 5.0.11. The simulated environment was 
developed on a system with an AMD Dual-Core Mobile M620 2.5GHz with a 4 GB 
RAM. 
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In section 4.2 we present and analyze the performance results of the detection 
part of the model, in section 4.3 we present and analyze the performance results of the 
recovery part of the model and in section 4.4 we present the analysis of our model in 
terms of memory consumption. 
4.2 Performance results and analysis of the Detection algorithm 
The recovery of the database consists of two phases the detection phase where 
the affected transactions are detected and the recovery phase where the malicious 
transactions are undone and the affected transactions are redone. In this section we 
simulate and analyze the performance of the detection phase of the model. 
The NorthWind database that was used in the experiment has been tailored 
slightly in order to fit the requirements of the algorithm. To simplify the input data to the 
detection algorithm we used a subset of the tables found in the original North Wind 
database. The tables that have been used throughout the simulation are: 
1. Categories Table: represents the categories of the products that are sold and it has 5 
columns. 
2. Customers Table: represents the customers with their details and contact information 
and it has 12 columns. 
3. Employees Table: represents the employees that sell products to the customers and it 
has 18 columns. 
4. Order_details Table: represents the details (such as quality) of the orders that have 
been made by the customers and it has 7 columns. 
46 
5. Orders Table: represents the high level information about the order (the related 
customer and employee) and it has 15 columns. 
6. Products Table: represents the items/products that can be bought in the North Wind 
database and it has 11 columns. 
7. Suppliers Table: represents the suppliers/providers of the products and it has 13 
columns. 
In addition to the previous assumptions that were used to develop our recovery model 
we have the below two assumptions for the simulation part: 
1. The maximum number of data items accessed by any transaction is equal to the 
number of data items present in the table to which the transaction belongs. So for 
example if a transaction is adding a new category to the categories table, it can 
access a maximum of five data items when doing so (these are the 5 fields/columns 
present in the categories table). 
2. In order to have global uniqueness of the database rows, we added one additional 
column to represent the global primary key of table records. The previous primary 
key used in the table is unique only for the scope of the table in concern but not to 
other tables. This will help us in identifying transactions by global ID’s. So for 
example when we say transaction with ID = 9, there is only one transaction with ID 
= 9 in the database where before altering the database there could be two rows in 
different tables with primary keys = 9 and hence making confusion on which one to 
pick. 
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Since the performance of our algorithm depends mainly on the number of 
transactions to be scanned to check them if they are affected or not, we analyze the 
performance of our detection algorithm with respect to the ID of the smallest malicious 
transaction. The ID of the smallest malicious transaction determines the scope of 
scanning since the detection starts directly at the first transaction after the smallest 
malicious transaction and continues onwards to the end of the log file. 
Figure 4.1 below shows the performance of the Detection phase of our model 
with respect to Attacker ID. What is meant by the Attacker ID is the smallest ID present 
in the list of malicious transactions sent to the detection algorithm. From the first look at 
the figure we can deduce the correctness of our model assumption that as the Attacker 
ID increases, the performance of our detection algorithm enhances because it will have 
to scan less transactions to see if they are affected or not. 
Figure 4.1 Performance of the detection algorithm with respect to Attacker ID 
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The previous analysis was performed on a database snapshot consisting of 1080 records. 
Any transaction can access a maximum of 18 data items at a time (since the largest 
number of columns in any of our tables is 18 and it is the employees table).  
 Due to our assumption that the execution history is rigorously Serializable, we 
cannot find two transactions Ti and Tj such that i<j and Ti happens after Tj. As a result, 
there cannot be a transaction that happened before a malicious transaction and is affected 
by this malicious transaction. This is shown in the results in figure 4.1. When the 
attacker ID is 50, the detection algorithm will have to scan 1030 transactions (1080 
minus 50) to check if any one of them is infected from the malicious transaction with ID 
50. On the other hand, when the attacked ID is 1000 the detection algorithm will have to 
scan only 80 transactions (1080 minus 1000). The time decreases from 0.33 
microseconds to 0.104 microseconds when the attacker ID changes from 50 to 1000, 
which is more than threefold performance enhancement. Therefore our detection 
algorithm proves to be very efficient when the attacker ID decreases and still performs 
very well when the attacker ID is small. 
In order to measure the performance of our damage assessment/detection algorithm we 
have compared it with other models present in [7]. The three other models are the 
traditional, traditional clustered, and the hybrid sub-cluster models. The traditional 
model was presented by Bai and Liu in [15]. The previous experiments were done on a 
database with 200 records. Therefore, we have sampled another snapshot of our version 
of the northwind database in order to have proper comparison between our matrix based 
model and the previously mentioned models. 
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Figure 4.2 Performance results of our model compared to other models 
 
Figure 4.2 shows that efficiency of our matrix based model compared to other models. 
So for example in the worst case scenario (when the attacker ID is 50), comparing our 
model to the fastest of the other models, hybrid sub-cluster model shows that our model 
is at least 625,000 times faster. In the best case scenario (when the attacker ID is 150), 
our model is at least 270 times faster. On the other hand, if we take the slowest of the 
three other models, the traditional model, our model is faster by 5,312,000 times. The 
high performance of our model is due mainly to the dependency matrix that only stores 
the information needed for the damage assessment in the form of linked lists that are 
sorted to decrease the assessment time by removing unnecessary check to transactions 
that are not affected. Our matrix is easily indexed unlike other complex data structure 
used in other models such as graphs. Moreover our matrix only stores the IDs of the 
transactions that depend on each other. Another important difference is that our model 
does not read the entire execution history or even the entire dependency matrix, but it 
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only reads the information from the dependency matrix starting from the first transaction 
after the smallest malicious transaction. 
 A recent matrix based algorithm presented by Haraty and Zbib in [24] showed 
promising results in terms of running times. Therefore, in order to know the performance 
of our model in comparison to similar models that are matrix based, we analyzed the 
performance of our model with the model in [24]. Figure 4.3 shows the results of 
comparing our model to [24]. 
Figure 4.3 Performance of our detection model compared to other matrix based models 
 
Figure 4.3 shows clearly that our model is more efficient than the most recent matrix 
based models. This is evident from the big difference in the running time between the 
two models. There is a ratio of 55 times when the attacker ID is 50 and there is a ratio of 
58 when the attacker ID is 1000. This difference in performance is due to the following: 
1. The fact that our algorithm uses only one light weight matrix instead of two 
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2. Our model stores only the dependency between transactions instead of storing an 
n*m matrix (n is the number of transactions in the database and m is the number 
of data items in the database) 
3. Our model uses Sorted Linked Lists that saves more space and makes the 
algorithm lighter and faster. Moreover, by being sorted, the linked lists removes 
many unnecessary checks that are done in the matrix of [24] since in our model 
whenever we reach a transaction that is greater than the one we are looking for we 
skip the rest of the linked list and move to the second row in the dependency 
matrix. 
 The previous figures (4.1, 4.2, and 4.3) show that our model is faster from other 
models that may not necessarily use a matrix and models that are based on matrices like 
the one in [24]. Moreover, our model is lightweight and does not require a lot of 
memory in order to execute efficiently and hence making it more scalable for larger 
databases. 
4.3 Performance results and analysis of the Recovery algorithm 
In order to analyze the performance of the recovery phase of our model, we have 
also simulated it on the modified version of the northwind database. Since it is logical 
for the recovery algorithm to take more time to recover as the number of transactions to 
be recovered increases, we analyzed the performance of our algorithm with respect to an 
increasing number of recovered transactions. The experiment was done on a database 
with 200 records where any transaction can access a maximum of 18 data items at a 
time. The results of the simulation are presented in figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4 Performance of our recovery model with respect to increasing number of 
recovered transactions 
 
The transactions to be recovered could include both the malicious transactions and the 
affected transactions. As it appears from figure 4.4, the time taken by our recovery algorithm 
increases with the number of transactions to be recovered. This increase in time is quite 
acceptable since when the transactions to be recovered increased by 5 folds, the time to recover 
increased from 0.0002 micro-seconds to 0.0012 micro-seconds. 
 In figure 4.5 below we analyze the performance of our matrix based recovery algorithm 
with four other models as presented in [7]. These four other models are the traditional, 
traditional clustered (with data dependency), hybrid sub-clustered (with a fixed number of 
transactions), and hybrid sub-clustered (with a fixed size of the sub-cluster).  
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Figure 4.5 Performance of our recovery model with respect to other models 
 
Figure 4.5 shows that our recovery algorithm out performs all of the other models whatever was 
the Attacker ID. For example in the case when the Attacker ID is 50, our recovery model is 
faster by 8,500,000,000 times than the slowest model (Traditional model) and is faster by 
2,800,000,000 times than the fastest model (Hybrid Sub-Clustered with fixed size). The main 
contribution of our model which is the use of a light weight matrix is the main reason behind its 
high performance. The entries of matrix are sorted linked lists which highly decrease the 
assessment time by removing unnecessary checks in the model. Moreover, out recovery model 
converts the log file into an array (this conversion step is done only once throughout the 
recovery phase) which is a lot faster to access than the log file itself. So instead of accessing the 
log every time we want to access a certain transaction (which is time consuming due to the high 
cost of I/O involved), we access them as entries of an array which is indexed by nature. While 
converting the log file to an array, we only take into consideration the part of the log file that 
starts after the first malicious transaction not the whole log file. This will decrease the size of the 
array to only store the entries that are needed for recovery because the transactions that 
happened before the first malicious transactions need not to be recovered because they cannot be 
affected to our assumption of rigorous Serializable execution. 
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In order to analyze the performance of our recovery model with respect to other matrix 
based models, we used the model in [24] which is a recent matrix based model. In the below 
figure we compared the performance of our recovery algorithm to Haraty and Zbib matrix based 
model in [24] with respect to an increasing number of transactions to be recovered. The database 
that we used consists of 200 transactions where each transaction can access a maximum of 18 
data items at any time. 
Figure 4.6 Performance analysis of our recovery model with respect to Haraty and Zbib model 
 
As we can see from figure 4.6, our recovery model is around two times as fast as the other 
matrix model. The high performance of our algorithm is due to the fact that we only read the 
needed part from the log file and we populate it into an array that reduces the access time when 
we need to recover any transaction. 
 
4.4 Performance results and analysis of the memory consumption 
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Our recovery algorithm is not only efficient in terms or running time, but also it 
is very efficient in terms of memory consumption. The low memory consumption of our 
model makes it more efficient with databases of larger sizes due to its increased 
scalability levels. In order to analyze the performance of our model in terms of memory 
needs, we compared its memory needs to Haraty & Zbib model [24] both in the best case 
and worst case scenarios. In the below figures we assume that the memory slots 
consumed by any algorithm is the number of content entries in all of its data structures. 
So for example if we have a transaction T4 that depends on three other transactions (T1, 
T2, T3), then the memory slots used to represent this dependency relation is 3. In our 
model we use only one matrix while in the model presented in [24], they use a matrix 
and a secondary structure. In our comparison we assumed that we have a database that is 
made up of 1000 transactions and 100 data items. As a result of this the model in [24] 
will have a dependency matrix made up of 100,000 entries (1000 transactions * 100 data 
items) that will be used and populated whatever the dependency between the 
transactions was. Our model does not have such matrix and on the contrary uses a matrix 
that depends on the dependency relation between the transactions and not on the number 
of transactions and data items in the database. 
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Figure 4.7 Best Case scenario memory consumption analysis 
 
In figure 4.7 we compared the memory consumption under the best case scenario 
of our algorithm to latest matrix based recovery algorithm presented in [24]. The best 
case scenario (where the lowest number of memory slots is used) occurs in both 
algorithms when each transaction depends on only one other transaction not more. As a 
result, in the case of our algorithm we will use only a number of memory slots that is 
equal to half of the dependent transactions number and in the case of Haraty’s model we 
will not use the secondary structure to store the dependency relation. In the case of 50 
dependent transactions, the matrix used in our model will be an array of length 25 and at 
each index we have only one transaction (memory slot). On the other hand, the model in 
[24] will not use any secondary data structures but it will populate the core matrix that 
will have 100,000 entries. As we can see from figure 4.7, the number of memory slots 
used by the model in [24] is 4,000 times than the memory slots used in our model. 
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Figure 4.8 Worst Case scenario memory consumption analysis 
 
 In figure 4.8 we analyze the memory consumption under the worst case scenario (when the 
highest number of memory slots is consumed by both algorithms). The worst case scenario 
occurs when one transaction depends on the remaining transactions in the set. So for example 
when we have 50 related transactions, one transaction depends on the remaining 49 transactions. 
In this case our model will have a matrix with 49 entries and the model in [24] will use the 
secondary structure to reflect this dependency relation by using also an extra 49 entries. As a 
performance indicator when we can take the case when the set of dependent transactions is 50, 
the model in [24] will consume 100049 slots and our model will consume only 49 slots (i.e. 
2,042 times more slots consumed by the model in [24]). 
  From the previous experiments it is evident that our model is very efficient in terms of 
its memory consumption. This makes it more scalable for databases with very large sizes. This 
also helps in indirectly enhancing the running time of our model because it is expected that 
whenever an algorithm consumes less memory than its peers it will run faster. The matrix used 
in our model stores only the data needed for the detection and recovery without any additional 
unnecessary information. Unlike the Haraty and Zbib model in [24], our matrix does not store 
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information about blind writes or explicit information that T2 does not depend on T1. What 
matters for the recovery in our model is the explicit information that Ty depends on Tx and 
nothing else.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
A layered approach is adopted in most of the information systems protection. We 
should first prevent or at least reduce the possibility of an attack. Then, we should detect 
any attempts of an attack before the attack damages any data. Prevention methods do not 
always work; hackers and attackers always find ways to breach the system. Again 
detection systems fail to detect the malicious transaction as soon as they happen. Here 
comes the role of recovery algorithms that will repair the damage of the data by cleaning 
the database from the malicious transactions and their effects. The algorithm described 
in this thesis presents a new matrix based approach for database recovery that is 
lightweight and more efficient than all the other methods currently found in the 
literature. We implemented the algorithm and compared it with different recovery 
algorithms available and showed that our algorithm outperforms them in multiple times. 
These experimental results prove that our algorithm is more efficient and requires less 
space than the other proposed models including other matrix based ones. In both phases 
of the recovery process (assessment phase and recovery phase), the presented algorithm 
has outperformed its counter parts. 
As a future work, we will work on a distributed version of the algorithm. Our 
model works on a centralized database where only one copy of the data exists. The 
algorithm needs to take into consideration the fact that different parts of the data could 
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be distributed or replicated into different sites creating new challenges that need to be 
dealt with in order to achieve the correct recovery. 
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